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Abstract
Increased concern about data privacy has prompted new and
updated data protection regulations worldwide. However,
there has been no rigorous way to test whether the practices
mandated by these regulations actually align with the privacy
norms of affected populations. Here, we demonstrate that
surveys based on the theory of contextual integrity provide
a quantifiable and scalable method for measuring the con-
formity of specific regulatory provisions to privacy norms.
We apply this method to the U.S. Children’s Online Privacy
Protection Act (COPPA), surveying 195 parents and provid-
ing the first data that COPPA’s mandates generally align with
parents’ privacy expectations for Internet-connected “smart”
children’s toys. Nevertheless, variations in the acceptabil-
ity of data collection across specific smart toys, informa-
tion types, parent ages, and other conditions emphasize the
importance of detailed contextual factors to privacy norms,
which may not be adequately captured by COPPA.
1 Introduction
Data privacy protections in the United States are enforced
through a combination of state and federal legislation and
regulatory action. In Europe, the General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR) is currently the best example of strong,
centralized privacy legislation. The GDPR has inspired sim-
ilar laws in other countries, such as the Brazilian General
Data Privacy Law. According to the United Nations Confer-
ence on Trade and Development [51], 57% of countries have
data protection and privacy legislation as of 2018.
Although data privacy protections vary across countries
in terms of details and implementation, many share a com-
mon provenance: public pressure to protect sensitive per-
sonal data from unauthorized use or release. Surveys report
that consumers worldwide were more concerned about on-
line privacy in 2016 than 2014 [7] and that over 60% of U.S.
survey respondents in 2018 are concerned about data privacy
in general [34]. However, there has been no rigorous, quan-
tifiable, and scalable way to measure whether existing legal
privacy protections actually match the privacy expectations
of affected individuals. Without such data, it is difficult to
know which aspects of privacy regulation effectively align
company behaviors with social and cultural privacy norms
and which necessitate further revision.
In this paper, we demonstrate that an existing survey tech-
nique [3] based on the formal privacy theory of contextual
integrity (CI) [32] can be directly adapted to test the confor-
mity of specific regulatory requirements to privacy norms,
providing much-needed data to policymakers and the pri-
vacy research community. The survey technique can be ap-
plied to any privacy regulation that defines guidelines for
data collection and transfer practices. Importantly, the sur-
vey technique involves questions describing privacy scenar-
ios that are concrete and understandable to respondents from
all backgrounds. It also allows straightforward longitudinal
and cross-sector measurements to track the effectiveness of
regulatory updates over time.
We present a rigorous case study of this technique eval-
uating the U.S. Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act
(COPPA), which provides a federal legal framework to pro-
tect the online privacy of children under the age of 13.
Specifically, we investigate whether parents’ opinions about
the acceptability of data collection practices by Internet-
connected “smart” children’s toys match COPPA mandates.
Since the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) only updated its
guidance on COPPA to explicitly include “connected toys or
other Internet of Things devices” in June 2017 [16], our re-
sults provide the first indication as to whether COPPA aligns
with parents’ privacy expectations.
This question is particularly relevant given the recent high-
profile security breaches of smart toys, ranging from the theft
of personal information of over 6 million children from toy
manufacturer VTech to vulnerabilities in Mattel’s Hello Bar-
bie [13]. More recently, Germany banned children’s smart
watches and Genesis Toys’ My Friend Cayla doll, citing se-
curity risks and “spying concerns” [17, 31].
We survey a panel of 195 U.S. parents of children from
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ages 3 to 13, the largest sample size for a study of parent
opinions of smart toy data collection in the literature to date.
We find that parents generally view information collection
predicated on requirements specified by COPPA (e.g., “if the
information is used to protect a child’s safety”) as accept-
able, while viewing equivalent information collection with-
out COPPA-specified conditions as unacceptable. This indi-
cates that the existing conditions COPPA places on informa-
tion collection by smart toys are generally in line with par-
ents’ privacy norms, although there may be additional data
collection requirements which could be added to regulation
that were not tested in our study.
Additionally, we find that COPPA requirements for notifi-
cation and consent result in more acceptable data collection
practices than requirements related to confidentiality and se-
curity. This corroborates previous work indicating the pri-
mary importance of consent to user privacy norms [3]. We
also find variations in the acceptability of COPPA-permitted
data collection practices across specific smart toys, types of
information, certain information use cases, parent ages, par-
ent familiarity with COPPA, and whether parents own smart
devices. These variations emphasize the importance of de-
tailed contextual factors to parents’ privacy norms and mo-
tivate additional studies of populations with privacy norms
that may be poorly represented by COPPA.
We conclude by noting that COPPA’s information collec-
tion criteria are broad enough to allow smart toy implementa-
tions that compromise children’s privacy while still adhering
to the letter of the law. Continuing reports of smart toys vio-
lating COPPA [6] also suggest that many non-compliant toys
remain available for purchase. Further improvements to both
data privacy regulation and enforcement are still needed to
keep pace with corporate practices, technological advance-
ments, and privacy norms.
In summary, this paper makes the following contributions:
• Demonstrates that an existing survey method [3] based
on contextual integrity [32] can be applied to test
whether privacy regulations effectively match the norms
of affected populations.
• Provides the first quantitative evidence that COPPA’s re-
strictions on smart toy data collection generally align
with parents’ privacy expectations.
• Serves as a template for future work using contextual
integrity surveys to analyze current or proposed privacy
regulation for policy or systems design insights.
2 Background & Related Work
In this section, we place our work in the context of related
research on contextual integrity, COPPA, and smart toys.
2.1 Contextual Integrity
The theory of contextual integrity (CI) provides a well-
established framework for studying privacy norms and ex-
pectations [32]. Contextual integrity defines privacy as the
appropriateness of information flows based on social or cul-
tural norms in specific contexts. CI describes information
flows using five parameters: (1) the subject of the informa-
tion being transferred, (2) the sender of this information,
(3) the attribute or type of information, (4) the recipient of
the information, and (5) the transmission principle or condi-
tion imposed on the transfer of information from the sender
to the recipient. For example, one might be comfortable
with a search engine (recipient) collecting their (subject &
sender) Internet browsing history (attribute) in order to im-
prove search results (transmission principle), but not in or-
der to improve advertisement targeting, which is a different
transmission principle that places the information in a dif-
ferent context governed by different norms. Privacy norms
can therefore be inferred from the reported appropriateness
and acceptability of information flows with varying combi-
nations of these five parameters.
Previous research has used CI to discover and analyze pri-
vacy norms in various contexts. In 2012, Winter used CI
to design an interview study investigating Internet of things
(IoT) device practices that could be viewed as privacy viola-
tions [54].
In 2016, Martin and Nissenbaum conducted a survey with
vignette questions based on CI to understand discrepancies
between people’s stated privacy values and their actions in
online spaces [27]. Rather than straightforward contradic-
tions, they find that these discrepancies are due to nuanced
effects of contextual information informing real-world ac-
tions. This result motivates the use of CI in our study and
others to investigate privacy norms in realistic situations.
In 2016, Shvartzshnaider et al. used the language of CI to
survey crowdworkers’ privacy expectations regarding infor-
mation flow in the education domain [46]. Survey respon-
dents indicated whether information flows situated in clearly
defined contexts violated acceptability norms. The results
were converted into a logic specification language which
could be used to verify privacy norm consistency and iden-
tify additional acceptable information flows.
In 2018, we designed a scalable survey method for discov-
ering privacy norms using questions based on CI [3]. We ap-
plied the survey method to measure the acceptability of 3,840
information flows involving common connected devices for
consumer homes. Results from 1,731 Amazon Mechanical
Turk respondents informed recommendations for IoT device
manufacturers, policymakers, and regulators.
This paper adapts the survey method from our previous
work [3] for a specific application: comparing privacy norms
to privacy regulation. Our use of language from regula-
tion in CI survey questions, direct comparison of discov-
ered privacy norms to policy compliance plans, and survey
panel of special interest individuals (parents of children un-
der age 13) distinguishes our work from previous uses of the
survey method and previous CI studies in general.
2.2 COPPA & Smart Toys
Previous research has investigated Internet-connected toys
and COPPA from various perspectives. Several studies have
focused on identifying privacy and/or security vulnerabili-
ties of specific smart toys [45, 48, 53], some of which are
expressly noted as COPPA violations [6]. Our work uses
these examples to inform the information flow descriptions
included on our survey.
Researchers have also developed methods to automate the
detection of COPPA violations. In 2017, Zimmeck et al. au-
tomatically analyzed 9,050 mobile application privacy poli-
cies and found that only 36% contained statements on user
access, editing, and deletion rights required by COPPA [59].
In 2018, Reyes et al. automatically analyzed 5,855 Android
applications designed for children and found that a majority
potentially violated COPPA [43]. Most violations were due
to collection of personally identifiable information or other
identifiers via third-party software development kits (SDKs)
used by the applications, often in violation of SDK terms of
service. These widespread violations indicate that COPPA
remains insufficiently enforced. Nevertheless, COPPA re-
mains the primary legal foundation for state [30] and fed-
eral [12] action against IoT toy manufacturers and other tech-
nology companies for children’s privacy breaches.
Additional work has investigated parents’ and chil-
dren’s relationships with Internet-connected toys. In 2015,
Manches et al. conducted observational fieldwork of children
playing with Internet-connect toys and held in-school work-
shops to investigate parents’ and children’s cognizance of
how IoT toys work [26]. They found that most children and
caregivers were unaware of IoT toys’ data collection poten-
tial, but quickly learned fundamental concepts of connected
toy design when instructed.
In 2017, McReynolds et al. conducted interviews with par-
ents and children to understand their mental models of and
experience with Internet-connected toys [28]. Parents in this
study were more aware of and concerned about IoT toy pri-
vacy than in [26], likely due to the intervening two years of
negative publicity about connected toy privacy issues. The
parents interviewed by McReynolds et al. provided feedback
about desired privacy properties for connected toys, such as
improved parental controls and recording indicators. The re-
searchers urge ongoing enforcement of COPPA, but do not
evaluate the parents’ responses in light of the law.
Our work builds on past research by obtaining opinions
about smart toy information collection and transfer practices
from a much larger pool of parents (195 subjects). We use
these data to evaluate whether privacy protections mandated
by COPPA align with parents’ privacy norms.
3 CI Survey Method
This study adapts a CI-based survey method first presented
in our previous work [3] to evaluate whether specific require-
ments in privacy regulations align with user privacy norms.
We chose this particular survey method because it is previ-
ously tested, scalable to large respondent populations, and
easily adaptable to specific domains. The survey method
works as follows, with our modifications for regulation anal-
ysis marked in italics:
1. Information transfers (“flows”) are defined according to
CI as sets of five parameters: subject, sender, attribute,
recipient, and transmission principle (described in Sec-
tion 2.1).
2. We select lists of values for each of these parameters
drawn from or directly relevant to a particular piece of
privacy regulation. Using these values, we generate a
combinatorial number of information flow descriptions
allowed or disallowed by the regulation.
3. Survey respondents rate the acceptability of these infor-
mation flows, each of which describe a concrete data
collection scenario in an understandable context.
4. Comparing the average acceptability of flows allowed
or disallowed by the regulation indicates how well they
align with respondents’ privacy norms.
5. Variations in acceptability contingent upon specific in-
formation flow parameters or respondent demographics
can reveal nuances in privacy norms that may or may
not be well served by the regulation.
The following sections provide detailed descriptions of our
survey design (Sections 3.1–3.2), deployment (Section 3.3),
and results analysis (Section 3.4) for comparing parents’ pri-
vacy norms about smart toy data collection against COPPA
regulation. Many of these steps mirror those in our previous
work [3], but we include them here with specific details from
this study for the sake of replicability.
3.1 Generating Smart Toy Information Flows
We first selected CI information flow parameters (Table 1)
involving smart toys and specific data collection require-
ments from COPPA. We then programmatically generated
information flow descriptions from all possible combinations
of the selected CI parameters.
We next discarded certain information flow descriptions
with unrealistic sender/attribute pairs, such as a toy speaker
(sender) recording a child’s heart rate (attribute). Unrealis-
tic sender/attribute pairs were identified at the authors’ dis-
cretion based on whether each toy could reasonably be ex-
pected to have access to each type of data during normal use.
This decision was informed by smart toy products currently
available on the market. The use of exclusions to remove
unrealistic information flows is a core part of the CI survey
method [3] for reducing the total number of questions and
the corresponding cost of running the survey. This process
resulted in 1056 total information flow descriptions for use
in CI survey questions (Section 3.2).
The degree to which these flows are rated as acceptable or
unacceptable by survey respondents indicate agreement or
disagreement between COPPA and parents’ privacy norms.
This rest of this section describes how we selected values for
each information flow parameter in detail.
Transmission Principles from COPPA. We used the Fed-
eral Trade Commission’s Six Step Compliance Plan for
COPPA [10] to identify transmission principles. Some of
these transmission principles match those in our previous
work [3], facilitating results comparison.
We converted steps 2–4 of the Compliance Plan into four
transmission principles regarding consent, notification, and
privacy policy compliance (Table 1). COPPA dictates that
parents must receive direct notice and provide verifiable con-
sent before information about children is collected. Opera-
tors covered by COPPA must also post a privacy policy that
describes what information will be collected and how it will
be used. Our corresponding transmission principles allow us
to test whether these requirements actually increase the ac-
ceptability of data collection from and about children.
The fifth step of the Compliance Plan concerns “parents’
ongoing rights with respect to personal information collected
from their kids” [10]. Operators must allow parents to review
collected information, revoke their consent, or delete col-
lected information. We translated this requirement into the
transmission principle “if its owner can at any time revoke
their consent, review or delete the information collected.”
The sixth step of the Compliance Plan concerns opera-
tors’ responsibility to implement “reasonable procedures to
protect the security of kids’ personal information” [10] and
to only release children’s information to third party service
providers who can do likewise. We translated this step into
five transmission principles involving confidentiality, secu-
rity, storage and deletion practices (Table 1).
The Compliance Plan also lists a set of exclusions to
COPPA. We converted the exclusions that were most ap-
plicable to Internet-connected children’s devices into four
transmission principles (Table 1). We also added the trans-
mission principle “if it complies with the Children’s Online
Privacy Protection Rule” to test parents’ trust and awareness
of COPPA itself.
Importantly, we also included the null transmission prin-
ciple to create control information flows with no COPPA-
based criteria. Comparing the acceptability of flows with
the null transmission principle against equivalent flows with
COPPA-based transmission principles allows us to deter-
mine whether the COPPA conditions are relevant to parents’
privacy norms.
Smart Toy Senders. The senders included in our survey
represent five categories of children’s IoT devices: a smart
speaker/baby monitor, a smart watch, a toy walkie-talkie,
a smart doll, and a toy robot. We chose these senders
by searching for children’s Internet-connected devices men-
tioned in recent press articles [13, 17, 20, 29, 31, 35], aca-
demic papers [5, 25], blogs [9, 19, 37], IoT-specific web-
sites [21, 23, 38], and merchants such as Toys “R” Us and
Amazon. All of the selected senders are devices that are rea-
sonably “directed towards children” [10, 11] in order to en-
sure that they are covered by COPPA. We excluded devices
such as smart thermometers or other smart home devices that
might collect information about children but are not directly
targeted at children.
It is important to note that the selected devices do not rep-
resent the full breadth of smart toy products. However, infor-
mation flow descriptions involving specific devices or device
categories evoke more richly varied privacy norms from sur-
vey respondents than flows describing a generic “smart toy.”
This is supported by existing interview data [58] noting that
IoT device owners often have very different privacy opinions
of specific entities than of their generic exemplars (e.g., the
“Seattle government” versus “government”).
Information Attributes. We reviewed academic re-
search [25], online privacy websites [38], toy descrip-
tions [15], and privacy policies [18, 36] to compile a list of
information attributes collected by the toys in our sender list.
The final selected attributes include heart rate, frequently
asked questions, the times the subject is home, frequently
traveled routes, the times the device is used, location, sleep-
ing habits, call history, audio of the subject, emergency con-
tacts, video of the subject, and birthday. These attributes
cover a variety of personally identifiable or otherwise sen-
sitive information with specific handling practices mandated
by COPPA.
First- and Third-party Recipients. We included device
manufacturers and third-party service providers as recipient
parameters. This allowed us to examine variations in privacy
between first and third parties while limiting the total number
of information flows and the corresponding cost of running
the survey.
Children as Information Subjects. The only subject pa-
rameter included in the survey is “its owner’s child.” This
wording emphasizes that the child is not the owner of the
device and acknowledges the parental role in ensuring chil-
dren’s privacy. It also accounts for devices that may not be
used directly or exclusively by the child (e.g., a baby mon-
itor). We indicated in the survey overview that respondents
should think about their own children’s information when in-
terpreting this subject.
Sender Transmission Principle
a smart speaker/baby monitor COPPA Compliance Plan Steps 2-3
a smart watch if its privacy policy permits it
a toy walkie-talkie if its owner is directly notified before the information was collected
a smart doll
a toy robot COPPA Compliance Plan Step 4
if its owner has given verifiable consent
Recipient if its owner has given verifiable consent before the information was collected
its manufacturer
a third-party service provider COPPA Compliance Plan Step 5
if its owner can at any time revoke their consent, review or delete the information collected
Subject & Attribute
its owner’s child’s heart rate COPPA Compliance Plan Step 6
its owner’s child’s frequently if it implements reasonable procedures to protect the information collected
asked questions if the information is kept confidential
the times its owner’s child is home if the information is kept secure
its owner’s child’s frequently if the information is stored for as long as is reasonably necessary for the purpose
traveled routes for which it was collected
the times it is used if the information is deleted
its owner’s child’s location
its owner’s child’s sleeping habits COPPA Exclusions
its owner’s child’s call history if the information is used to protect a child’s safety
audio of its owner’s child if the information is used to provide support for internal operations of the device
its owner’s child’s emergency contacts if the information is used to maintain or analyze the function of the device
video of its owner’s child if the information is used to serve contextual ads
its owner’s child’s birthday
Other
if it complies with the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule
null
Table 1: Contextual integrity parameter values selected for information flow generation. The null transmission principle is an
important control included to generate information flows with no explicit conditions. The transmission principles were derived
from the FTC’s Six Step Compliance Plan for COPPA [10].
3.2 Survey Design
We created and hosted the survey on the Qualtrics plat-
form [39]. The survey was split into six sections: con-
sent, demographic questions I, overview, contextual in-
tegrity questions, awareness questions, and demographic
questions II. This section provides details about each sec-
tion. The survey did not mention COPPA, privacy, security,
nor any potential negative effects of smart toy information
flows prior to the contextual integrity questions to prevent
priming and framing effects.
Consent. Respondents were initially presented with a con-
sent form approved by our university’s Institutional Review
Board. Respondents who did not consent to the form were
not allowed to proceed with the study.
Demographic Questions I. The first set of demographic
questions asked respondents for the ages of their children
under 13. We chose this age limit because COPPA only ap-
plies to data collection from children under 13. We randomly
selected one of the ages for each respondent, n, which was
piped to the survey overview.
Overview. Respondents were then presented with a sur-
vey overview containing a brief description of Internet-
connected devices and instructions for the contextual in-
tegrity questions (Appendix A). This overview also ex-
plained how respondents should interpret the recurring
phrase “its owner’s child,” and instructed them to keep their
n-year-old child in mind while taking the survey (where n
was selected for each respondent from their responses to the
demographics questions I).
Contextual Integrity Questions. The core of the survey
consisted of 32 blocks of questions querying the acceptabil-
ity of our generated information flows (Section 3.1). Each
question block contained 33 information flows with the same
sender, same attribute, varying recipients, and varying trans-
mission principles. For example, one block contained all in-
formation flows with the sender “a smart doll” and the at-
tribute “the times it is used.” Each question block also in-
cluded one attention check question.
Each respondent was randomly assigned to a single ques-
tion block. Answering questions about flows with the same
sender and attribute reduced cognitive fatigue and ensured
independence across recipients and transmission principles.
The information flows in each block were divided into ma-
trices of individual Likert scale multiple choice questions.
The first matrix in each block contained questions about in-
formation flows to different recipients with the null trans-
mission principle (Figure 1). The remaining matrices each
contained questions about information flows to a specific re-
cipient with varying transmission principles (Figure 2). The
order of the information flows in each block was randomized
for each respondent.
Each individual multiple choice question in the matrices
asked respondents to rate the acceptability of a single infor-
mation flow on a scale of five Likert items: Completely Ac-
ceptable (2), Somewhat Acceptable (1), Neutral (0), Some-
what Unacceptable (-1), Completely Unacceptable (-2). We
also included the option “Doesn’t Make Sense” to allow re-
spondents to indicate if they didn’t understand the informa-
tion flow.
Awareness Questions. Respondents then answered ques-
tions about their general technological familiarity and In-
ternet use, ownership of Internet-connected devices, owner-
ship of children’s Internet-connected devices, and previous
knowledge of COPPA.
Demographic Questions II. Finally, respondents answered
standard demographic questions from the United States Cen-
sus. This allowed us to check the representativeness of our
sample (Appendix B, Section 5.2) and account for demo-
graphic variables in our analysis.
3.3 Survey Deployment
We tested the survey on UserBob [52] once during the sur-
vey design process and again immediately prior to deploy-
ment. UserBob is a usability testing service for obtaining
video screen capture of users interacting with a website while
recording audio feedback. Each survey test involved creating
a UserBob task with a link to the survey, brief instructions
for users,1 and settings to recruit 4 users to take the survey
for 7 minutes each. UserBob automatically recruited users
through Amazon Mechanical Turk at a cost of $1 per user per
minute. The resulting video and audio recordings of users
interacting with the survey informed changes to our survey
design. In particular, we reduced the number of questions
per block and increased the number of pages over which
the questions were presented. This reduced the amount of
1UserBob task instructions: “This is a survey that will be given to a
group of parents with children younger than 13. Take the survey, pretending
you have one or more children younger than 13. Record your thoughts on
the user interface and whether the questions do/don’t make sense.”
scrolling necessary to complete the survey and improved en-
gagement. This practice of using pre-deployment “cognitive
interviews” to test and debug survey design is common in
survey research [49]. UserBob responses were not included
the final results.
We used Cint [8], an insights exchange platform, to deploy
our survey to a panel of 296 adult parents of children under
the age of 13 in the United States. We selected respondents
with children younger than 13 because COPPA applies to
“operators of websites or online services directed to children
under 13” [11]. Our surveyed population therefore consisted
entirely of individuals affected by COPPA. We chose not to
set a minimum age for respondents’ children, because there
is a lack of readily available information on the minimum
age of use of Internet-connected children’s devices. While
certain manufacturers list recommended minimum ages for
their connected toys and devices, this was not the case for the
majority of the devices we considered. Additionally, many
devices such as wearable trackers, water bottles, baby mon-
itors, are targeted towards very young children. Lastly, not
restricting the minimum age allowed us to relax the demo-
graphic requirements for survey deployment.
Respondents were paid $3 for valid responses where the
attention check question was answered correctly. Each re-
spondent was only allowed to answer the survey once. The
survey responses were collected over an 18 hour time frame.
We chose Cint to deploy our survey instead of Amazon Me-
chanical Turk, because Cint allowed us to directly target a
specific panel of respondents (as in Zyskowski et al. [60])
without requiring a preliminary screening questionnaire to
identify parents [44].
3.4 Response Analysis
We began with 296 responses. We removed the responses
from 8 respondents who did not consent to the survey (none
of their information was recorded) as well as those from 85
respondents who did not correctly answer the attention check
question. We removed 2 responses in which over 50% of
the information flows were characterized as “Doesn’t make
sense.” We also removed 2 responses where not all informa-
tion flow questions were answered. Finally, we removed 1
response where the respondent self-reported over 10 children
and 3 responses that were completed in less than 2 minutes.
This resulted in a final set of 195 responses with an average
of 6 responses per information flow (standard deviation 1.4).
The responses to all contextual integrity questions (Sec-
tion 3.2) were on a Likert scale with the following Lik-
ert items: “Completely acceptable” (2), “Somewhat accept-
able” (1), “Neutral” (0), “Somewhat unacceptable” (-1), and
“Completely unacceptable” (-2). We call this value the “ac-
ceptability score” of each information flow for each respon-
dent.
In order to generalize privacy norms beyond individual re-
spondents and information flows, we averaged the accept-
Figure 1: Example CI question matrix with information flows to different recipients and the null control transmission principle.
Figure 2: Example CI question matrix with information flows to a fixed recipient and varying transmission principles.
ability scores of flows grouped by CI parameters or respon-
dent demographics. For example, we averaged the accept-
ability scores of all information flows with the recipient “its
manufacturer” and the transmission principle “if the infor-
mation is deleted” in order to quantify the pairwise effects
of these two parameters on privacy norms. We then plotted
these pairwise average acceptability scores as heatmaps to
visualize how individual CI parameters or respondent demo-
graphic factors affect the overall alignment of information
flows with privacy norms (Figures 3 & 4).
We statistically compared the effects of different COPPA
provisions (Sections 4.1–4.4) by averaging the acceptabil-
ity scores of all information flows grouped by transmission
principles. For example, one group contained the average
score given by each of the 195 respondents to information
flows with non-null transmission principles, while a second
group contained the average score given by each respondent
to information flows with the null transmission principle. We
then applied the Wilcoxon signed-rank test to find the like-
lihood that these two groups of scores come from the same
distribution. We performed three such tests with different
transmission principle groups and set the threshold for sig-
nificance to p = 0.05/3 = 0.016 to account for the Bonfer-
roni multiple-testing correction.
We statistically compared the effects of smart device
awareness, COPPA familiarity, and demographic factors
(Sections 4.5–4.8) by averaging the acceptability scores of
all information flows grouped by respondent category of in-
terest. For example, one group contained the average score
given by each respondent who owned a smart device across
all answered CI questions, while the second set contained the
average score given by each respondent who did not own a
smart device. We then applied the Wilcoxon signed-rank test
to find the likelihood that these two groups of scores come
from the same distribution. We performed five such tests
with groupings based on COPPA familiarity, age, smart de-
vice ownership, education, and income and set the threshold
for significance to p= 0.05/5= 0.01 to account for the Bon-
ferroni multiple-testing correction.
Transmission Principle Category
Notification & Consent Confidentiality & Security COPPA Exclusions
null 
Control
COPPA
Compliance
Figure 3: Average acceptability scores of information flows grouped by COPPA-derived transmission principles and attributes,
recipients, or senders. Scores range from −2 (completely unacceptable) to 2 (completely acceptable).
Transmission Principle Category
Notification & Consent Confidentiality & Security COPPA Exclusions
null 
Control
COPPA
Compliance
Figure 4: Average acceptability scores of information flows grouped by COPPA-derived transmission principles and respondent
ages, familiarity with COPPA, or ownership of smart devices. Scores range from−2 (completely unacceptable) to 2 (completely
acceptable)
4 Results
Overall, surveyed parents view information flows meeting
COPPA data collection guidelines as acceptable while view-
ing equivalent information flows without COPPA criteria as
unacceptable (Figures 3 & 4). This supports the conclusion
that COPPA-mandated information handling practices gen-
erally align with parents’ privacy norms. In this section, we
elaborate on this finding and explore additional trends in our
survey responses to further compare COPPA to parents’ pri-
vacy norms regarding children’s smart toys.
4.1 COPPA Data Collection Requirements
Align with Parents’ Privacy Norms
COPPA requirements were incorporated in the survey as
information flow transmission principles derived from the
FTC’s Six-Step Compliance Plan for COPPA [10] (Sec-
tion 3.1). The average acceptability scores of information
flows explicitly obeying these requirements are mostly non-
negative (Figures 3 & 4). This indicates that most surveyed
parents consider these flows as “completely acceptable” or
“somewhat acceptable.” In comparison, the average ac-
ceptability scores of information flows with the control null
transmission principle are mostly negative (Figures 3 & 4),
indicating that most surveyed parents consider these flows
without COPPA criteria as “completely unacceptable” or
“somewhat unacceptable.”
This difference between information flows with no explicit
conditions versus flows with COPPA requirements holds re-
gardless of information sender, recipient, attribute, or par-
ents’ demographics (apart from a few specific exceptions
which we discuss below). On average, information flows
with COPPA-derived transmission principles are 0.73 Likert-
scale points more acceptable than their null transmission
principle counterparts (p < 0.001).
Our research provides the first quantitative evidence that
COPPA guidelines generally match parents’ privacy norms
for Internet-connected toys. This indicates that regulation
can mandate meaningful transmission principles for infor-
mation flows and supports further creation and fine-tuning of
regulation to keep Internet data collection within the bounds
of consumer privacy preferences.
4.2 Parents View Data Collection for
Contextual Advertising as Unacceptable
Information flows with the transmission principle “if the
information is used to serve contextual ads” have negative
average acceptability scores across almost all senders, recip-
ients, and attributes (Figure 3). Unlike all other informa-
tion flows on our survey with non-null transmission prin-
ciples, these flows are actually prohibited by COPPA. The
“contextual ads” transmission principle is a “limited excep-
tion to COPPA’s verifiable parental consent requirement” as
listed in the COPPA Compliance Plan [10]. This exception
only applies to the collection of persistent identifiers (such
as cookies, usernames, or user IDs) and not to any of the at-
tributes included on our survey. Our respondents generally
agree that collecting the attributes on our survey for contex-
tual (targeted) advertising would be unacceptable, providing
further support for COPPA’s alignment with parents’ norms.
This result indicates that the CI survey technique can de-
tect regulatory provisions that reduce alignment with privacy
norms, essential for future applications of the method (Sec-
tion 6.2). It also provides evidence that the mere presence
of a transmission principle doesn’t necessarily improve the
acceptability of information flows.
This result relates to existing work about opinions of data
collection for advertising. Zheng et al. [58] interviewed own-
ers of non-toy Internet-connected home devices and found
mixed opinions of targeted advertising with data from these
devices depending on the perceived benefit to the user. Com-
bined with our results, this suggests that parents do not be-
lieve that relaxing COPPA to allow contextual advertising
from more types of children’s toy data would have enough
benefit to outweigh privacy concerns.
4.3 Parents View Children’s Birthdays as
Especially Private
Information flows including the subject and attribute “its
owner’s child’s birthday” are an exception to the trend de-
scribed in Section 4.1. The average acceptability scores
of information flows with this attribute and 10 of the 15
COPPA-derived transmission principles are negative (Fig-
ure 3). This discrepancy could be attributed to the relatively
small number of parents (11 parents or 5.6% of total respon-
dents) who were asked to score flows with this attribute. Par-
ents may also view their children’s birthdays as more per-
sonal than the other surveyed attributes or as less necessary
for some of the surveyed transmission principles (such as “to
maintain or analyze the function of the device”). Follow-up
qualitative studies could focus on specific attributes, such as
children’s birthdays, to understand parents’ rationales behind
corresponding privacy norms.
4.4 Notification & Consent Versus
Confidentiality & Security
Our results also provide insights into the relative impor-
tance of different sections within COPPA to parents’ privacy
norms. This could help regulators prioritize certain forms of
non-compliant information collection for legal action.
Our COPPA-derived transmission principles can be di-
vided into categories based on their topic and the section
of the COPPA Compliance Plan [10] from which they were
drawn (Section 3.1). One category consists of transmission
principles from the Compliance Plan steps 2–5 regarding no-
tification and consent (Table 1). These transmission princi-
ples involve device privacy policies, the collection of verified
consent, and the ability to revoke consent or review collected
information. Another category consists of transmission prin-
ciples from the Compliance Plan step 6 regarding informa-
tion confidentiality and security (Table 1). These transmis-
sion principles involve reasonable data protection, confiden-
tial and secure storage, and limited information lifetime.
Across all senders, attributes, and recipients, informa-
tion flows with transmission principles in the notifica-
tion/consent category have significantly higher acceptability
scores than flows with transmission principles in the con-
fidentiality/security category by an average of 0.43 Likert
scale points (p < 0.001) (Figure 3). One notable exception
to this trend is the transmission principle “if its privacy pol-
icy permits it.” The acceptability scores for this transmission
principle are an average of 0.53 Likert points lower than for
others in the notification/consent category (p < 0.001). We
suspect this reflects the general distrust of privacy policies
evidenced in previous research [50]. Privacy policies are
typically dense, lengthy, and difficult to interpret even for
experts [42]. It therefore makes sense that parents would not
view the disclosure of information collection in privacy poli-
cies as acceptable as other notification methods.
The greater acceptability of information flows with noti-
fication or consent criteria versus flows with confidential-
ity or security criteria corroborates previous research using
the CI survey method to discover privacy norms of non-
toy consumer IoT devices [3]. This provides longitudinal
data indicating that users of Internet-connected products con-
tinue to prioritize consent over built-in security when reason-
ing about the appropriateness of information collection prac-
tices. This motivates continued work to improve the state of
notification and consent mechanisms for Internet data collec-
tion. The most prevalent mechanisms, privacy policies and
mobile application permissions, are widely understood to be
ineffective for informing users or providing meaningful pri-
vacy control options [47]. As policies change to nuance the
definitions of informed consent to include ideas of intelligi-
bility, transparency and active opt-in, among others, it is im-
portant to continue to study and evaluate consumer’s privacy
expectations regarding consent.
4.5 COPPA Compliance and Familiarity
Increase Data Collection Acceptability
Information flows with the transmission principle “if it
complies with the Children’s Online Privacy Protection
Rule” received a positive average acceptability score of 0.49
across all senders, recipients, and attributes. As expected,
flows with this transmission principle were rated as more ac-
ceptable by the 67% of respondents familiar with COPPA
than by the 33% of respondents unfamiliar with the rule.
Furthermore, respondents who indicated that they were
familiar with COPPA rated all information flows 0.75 Lik-
ert points more acceptable on average than respondents who
were not familiar with the rule (p < 0.001) (Figure 4).
In both cases, stated compliance and/or familiarity with
COPPA may increase parents’ acceptance of smart toy data
collection by reassuring them that their children’s privacy is
protected by regulation. However, this may be a false sense
of security, as COPPA guidelines are relatively broad and
COPPA violations are likely widespread in practice (Sec-
tion 6.1) [6, 43].
4.6 Younger Parents are More Accepting of
Smart Toy Data Collection
Parents younger than 45 gave an average acceptability
score of 0.48 to all rated flows, following the trend discussed
in Section 4.1 (Figure 4). In comparison, parents 45 years
and older gave an average acceptability score of −0.17 to
all rated flows. This difference in the acceptability scores of
these two groups is significant (p< 0.01). Nevertheless, con-
text still matters, as information flows specifically “to protect
a child’s safety” are viewed as generally acceptable to all sur-
veyed parents regardless of age.
Previous work indicates that young American adults are
more aware of online privacy risks and more likely to take
steps to protect their privacy online than older adults [40].
Future studies could investigate why this awareness of online
privacy risks makes younger parents more accepting of smart
toy data collection.
4.7 Parents Who Own Smart Devices are
More Accepting of Data Collection
Parents who own generic smart devices or children’s smart
devices were more accepting of information flows than re-
spondents who do not own these devices on average, but the
difference in scores (0.34 Likert scale points) between these
two groups is not significant (p= 0.12).
Nevertheless, this difference corroborates previous work
using the CI survey method, in which owners of non-toy
consumer IoT devices were found to be more accepting of
information flows from these devices than non-owners [3].
This difference likely reflects a self-selection bias, in which
those more uncomfortable with Internet data collection are
less likely to purchase Internet-connected toys or other de-
vices. However, the small effect size in both this study and
the previous work may be due to parents purchasing smart
toys unaware of their data collection potential [26] or will-
ing to trade-off privacy concerns for other benefits provided
by the products [58].
4.8 Education & Income have Little Effect on
Parents’ Smart Toy Privacy Norms
Parents’ education and income did not have significant
effects on acceptability scores. Parents earning more than
$100,000 per year gave an average acceptability score of
0.46 to all rated flows, not significantly different from the
average score of 0.37 from parents earning less (p = 0.77).
Similarly, parents with at least some college education gave
an average acceptability score of 0.37, not significantly dif-
ferent from the 0.33 average score of parents with a high
school diploma or less (p = 0.58). This is perhaps unex-
pected given previous work indicating that parents with more
resources are more likely to engage with children on privacy
issues [41] and is a topic for follow-up research.
5 Limitations
Our results must be considered in the context of the follow-
ing limitations.
5.1 Privacy Attitudes Versus Behaviors
Individuals often self-report greater privacy awareness
and concerns than reflected in actual privacy-related behav-
iors [1, 22]. This “privacy paradox” is well-documented and
poses a challenge for researchers. The CI survey method
is vulnerable to privacy paradox effects. However, there is
a reasonable argument that privacy regulation should prior-
itize the expressed norms of users (measured by the survey
instrument) over norms evidenced through behaviors, which
are influenced by external factors (such as confusing user
interfaces) that could be affected by the regulation. For ex-
ample, it is often difficult for consumers to determine the
data collection practices of IoT devices, including Internet-
connected children’s toys, due to poor company disclosure
practices [42] and limited auditing by third parties. Just
because many parents purchase smart toys does not mean
that they approve of the toys’ data collection practices and
wouldn’t support new regulation to improve privacy.
5.2 Respondent Representativeness
The self-reported demographics of our respondents (Ap-
pendix B) indicate that the sample, while diverse, is non-
representative in ways that may influence measured privacy
norms.
Females and high-income individuals are notably overrep-
resented in our sample compared to the United States popu-
lation. The literature on gender differences in online privacy
concerns suggests that women may generally perceive more
privacy risks online than men [4, 14, 56], but some studies
contradict this conclusion, reporting no significant gender ef-
fect [55]. The effect of income on online privacy concerns
is similarly unsettled, with some reporting that high-income
individuals are less concerned about privacy [24, 33], oth-
ers reporting that high-income individuals are more likely to
engage in privacy-preserving behaviors [41], and still others
finding no significant income effect [57].
Limiting our survey to parents also ignores the opin-
ions of other parties, including school and daycare teachers
and extended family members, who also purchase Internet-
connected toys for children but may have different privacy
norms. These individuals are also affected by COPPA and
have legitimate justification for their opinions and interests
to be reflected in children’s privacy regulation. Likewise, we
did not ask whether our respondents were members of com-
munities that may have less common privacy norms, but our
respondent panel, drawn from across the United States, cer-
tainly missed smaller demographics.
Finally, our respondent panel consisted entirely of parents
living in the United States, as COPPA only applies to prod-
ucts sold in the U.S. These respondents are therefore influ-
enced by American attitudes toward privacy, which may vary
from those of parents in other countries. We hope that future
work will apply the CI survey method used in this paper to
evaluate the alignment between privacy norms and privacy
regulation in non-U.S. contexts.
5.3 Goals of Privacy Regulation
Our use of CI surveys to evaluate privacy regulation as-
sumes that the underlying value of such regulation is to bet-
ter align data collection practices with privacy norms. This
makes an implicit normative argument about the purpose of
privacy regulation, which does not necessarily hold, espe-
cially for the norms of majority populations. For example,
privacy regulation may seek to protect minority or otherwise
vulnerable populations. In these cases, surveys of all individ-
uals affected by the regulation may reflect a majority view
that does not value the norms or appreciate the situation of
the target population. CI surveys could still be applied in
these contexts, but care would need to be taken to identify
and recruit respondents from populations differentially af-
fected by the regulation in order to uncover discrepancies
between the regulation and the norms of these groups.
Additionally, some regulation may be created with the
goal of changing existing norms. In these cases, the CI sur-
vey method will indicate that the regulation does not match
current privacy expectations upon enactment. However, CI
surveys would still be useful for conducting longitudinal
measurements to track whether the regulation has the desired
effect on privacy norms over time.
6 Discussion & Future Work
We would like this study to serve as a template for future
work using contextual integrity to analyze current or pending
privacy regulation for policy or systems design insights. This
section discusses our COPPA findings and presents sugges-
tions for future applications of our method by policymakers,
device manufacturers, and researchers.
6.1 COPPA Insights & Concerns
Previous research indicates that parents actively manage
the information about their children on social media plat-
forms to avoid oversharing [2], and that owners of IoT home
appliances view most data collection by these devices as in-
herently unacceptable [3]. We expected that these domains
would overlap, resulting in skepticism of smart toy data col-
lection that even the restrictions in COPPA could not amelio-
rate. Surprisingly, it seems that the COPPA criteria assuaged
parents’ privacy concerns on average.
While we are encouraged that COPPA generally aligns
with parents’ privacy expectations, we are also concerned
that the existence of COPPA may give parents an unreason-
able expectation that their children’s data is protected, espe-
cially since parents familiar with COPPA were less critical
of smart toy information flows. In fact, several online ser-
vices and Internet-connected toys have been found to violate
COPPA [6,43], and many more non-compliant toys are likely
available for purchase. Additionally, the information collec-
tion guidelines in COPPA are relatively broad, leaving room
for technical implementations that adhere to the letter of the
law but still compromise children’s privacy. This motivates
continued work by regulators and researchers to identify toys
that place children’s privacy at risk, as well as healthy skep-
ticism by parents before purchasing any particular toy.
As an additional policy insight, variations in information
flow acceptability across recipients2 corroborate previous
work [58] indicating that privacy norms are deeply contin-
gent on the perception of entities that collect online data.
COPPA distinguishes between first- and third-parties, but
does not further categorize data recipients. This increases the
flexibility of the law, but raises the potential that some recip-
ients, which may viewed as completely unacceptable by pri-
vacy norms, could still legally get access to children’s data.
This suggests that incorporating a more contextual framing
of entities could improve the ability of future regulation to
prevent unwanted data collection practices.
6.2 Further Policy Analysis Applications
The CI survey method is not limited to COPPA. We would
like to see the results of follow-up studies focusing on differ-
ent regulation, such as the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA), the Family Educational Rights
and Privacy Act (FERPA), the National Cybersecurity Pro-
tection Advancement Act, the European General Data Pro-
tection Regulation (GDPR), and others from the local to in-
ternational level, to see if their requirements result in simi-
larly acceptable information flows for members of their tar-
get populations. As most privacy regulation encompasses in-
formation transfer or exchange, the theory of contextual in-
tegrity is an appropriate framework for this research. Further
2Information flows to first-party manufacturers have higher average ac-
ceptability scores than flows to third-party service providers (Figure 3).
studies would also allow cross-regulatory analysis to find
common factors that affect alignment with privacy norms.
The CI survey method could also be incorporated into the
policymaking process. Policy formulation and resource al-
location could be guided by surveying a wide-variety of in-
formation flows allowed under current regulation and iden-
tifying egregious or unexpected norm violations that require
attention. Policymakers could test whether previous regu-
latory approaches will be applicable to new innovations by
conducting surveys with CI parameters describing new tech-
nologies and existing regulation (e.g., smart toys and COPPA
prior to the 2017 inclusion of IoT devices [16]). Policymak-
ers could also perform A/B tests of policy drafts with differ-
ent stipulations and/or language by conducting multiple par-
allel surveys with varying CI parameters. These and other
use cases would improve quantitative rigor in data-driven
policy development and facilitate the design of regulation re-
sponsive to the privacy norms of affected populations.
6.3 Systems Design Applications
The application of CI surveys to guide systems and prod-
uct design is covered in detail in our previous work [3]. To
summarize, device manufacturers can conduct CI surveys to
determine whether information collection practices of de-
vices or new features under development will violate con-
sumer privacy norms. This allows modifications during the
design process to prevent consumer backlash and public re-
lations debacles.
Applying CI surveys to evaluate privacy regulation can
also yield valuable insights for systems research and devel-
opment. For example, learning that parents value the ability
to revoke consent or delete information (Figure 3) motivates
research into verifiable deletion of cloud data from IoT plat-
forms. Such insights are especially relevant as neither pri-
vacy norms nor regulations are necessarily tied to technical
systems feasibility. Discovering that a particular CI param-
eter value is crucial to privacy norm adherence could launch
several research projects developing efficient implementa-
tions or correctness proofs. We expect future applications
of the CI survey method will generate many such results.
7 Conclusion
Increased interest in data privacy has spurred new and up-
dated regulation around the world. However, there are no
widely accepted methods to determine whether this regula-
tion actually aligns with the privacy preferences of those it
seeks to protect. Here, we demonstrate that a previously de-
veloped survey technique [3] based on the formal theory of
contextual integrity (CI) can be adapted to effectively mea-
sure whether data privacy regulation matches the norms of
affected populations. We apply this methodology to test
whether the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act’s re-
strictions on data collection by Internet-connected “smart”
toys align with parents’ norms. We survey 195 parents of
children younger than 13 about the acceptability of 1056
smart toy information flows that describe concrete data col-
lection scenarios with and without COPPA restrictions.
We find that information flows conditionally allowed by
COPPA are generally viewed as acceptable by the sur-
veyed parents, in contrast to identical flows without COPPA-
mandated restrictions. These are the first data indicating the
general alignment of COPPA to parents’ privacy norms for
smart toys. However, variations in information flow accept-
ability across smart toys, information types, and respondent
demographics emphasize the importance of detailed contex-
tual factors to privacy norms and motivate further study.
COPPA is just one of many U.S. and international data
privacy regulations. We hope that this work will serve as a
template for others to adopt and repeat the CI survey method
to study other legislation, allowing for a cross-sectional and
longitudinal picture of the ongoing relationship between reg-
ulation and social privacy norms.
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Appendix A: Survey Overview
Survey overview shown to participants before contextual integrity information flow questions. Participants are asked to keep
one child in mind when answering the survey questions. The age of this child (9 in above example) is selected randomly for
each participant from the self-reported ages of each of their children younger than 13.
Appendix B: Self-Reported Demographics and Technical Background of Survey Respondents
Metric Sample Metric Sample
Female 61% 18-24 years old 3%
Male 39% 25-34 years old 31%
Other/Prefer not to disclose - 35-44 years old 48%
45-54 years old 13%
9th, 10th, 11th, 12th - no diploma 1% 55-64 years old 4%
High school graduate 14% 65 years or older <1%
Some college but no degree 22%
Associate degree in college - Vocational 6% Has 1 child 33%
Associate degree in college - Academic 4% Has 2 children 45%
Bachelor’s degree 30% Has 3 children 15%
Master’s degree 16% Has 4 or more children 7%
Professional school degree 2%
Doctorate degree 5% answers based on 0-3 yr old child 14%
answers based on 4-7 yr old child 36%
Less than $25,000 13% answers based on 8-12 yr old child 50%
Between $25,000 and $50,000 22%
Between $50,000 and $75,000 21% 0-3 hours of internet use per day 15%
Between $75,000 and $100,000 21% 4-7 hours of internet use per day 45%
Between $100,000 and $200,000 17% 8-12 hours of internet use per day 25%
More than $200,000 4% >12 hours of internet use per day 14%
Prefer not to disclose 2%
Uses a personal computer 97%
Asian 7% Uses a smartphone 94%
Black or African American 11% Uses a tablet device 78%
Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander 1%
White 76% Owns a smart device* 49%
White, American Indian or Alaska Native <1% Does not own a smart device 50%
White, Asian <1% Unsure <1%
White, Black or African American 1%
Other 3% Owns a children’s smart device** 33%
Does not own a children’s smart device 66%
Hispanic 14% Unsure 1%
Not Hispanic 85%
Prefer not to disclose <1% Familiar with COPPA 63%
Not familiar with COPPA 33%
Maybe familiar with COPPA 4%
* Question text: “Do you own any ‘smart’ (Internet-connected) devices or appliances besides a smartphone, tablet, laptop, or desktop
computer?”
** Question text: “Do you own any ‘smart’ (Internet-connected) devices or appliances used directly or indirectly by children besides a
smartphone, tablet, laptop, or desktop computer?”
